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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that urban social exclusion in China does not only 
include restricted participation by the “underclass” in urban life, but also the 
deprivation of certain political, social and economic rights. In addition, the 
paper describes how the character of urban social exclusion has changed over 
time. The author also examines the social exclusion of rural workers living and 
working in urban areas. The paper concludes by arguing that urban social 
exclusion in China needs coordinated reforms that target the whole set of 
problems in the urban “underclass” lacking political rights, social protection and 
economic opportunities. 
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Urban Social Exclusion in Transitional China 
 
Concerns over social exclusion in China appeared in the late 1990s (Tang, 
2002). The term “social exclusion” was first introduced to China through the 
agreements reached in the “World Summit for Social Development” held in 
Copenhagen in 1995. A document produced in the summit, “Copenhagen 
Declaration on Social Development and the Programme of Action of the World 
Summit for Social Development” (United Nations, 1995), points out that 
poverty, unemployment and social exclusion affect every country and are 
barriers to social development. Although it attracted some attention, the concept 
of social exclusion, its existence and influence in the contemporary society of 
China had not been researched in depth until very recently. Tang (2002) 
expresses the concerns of many researchers. He talked about the reason for the 
lack of enthusiasm in studying social exclusion: the term “social exclusion” 
(shehui paichi) had a lot of political connotations. The government authorities 
would not accept the concept of social exclusion, and it would not become part 
and parcel of social policy research unless scholars are not too politically 
oriented, are not emotional about the difficulties faced by vulnerable groups, 
and do not seek direct confrontation with the government. Despite the 
challenges, the term “social exclusion” appears frequently in academic journals 
in China. The core idea explored was “how to establish a more inclusive society 
and improve social solidarity” (Tang, 2002). The cautious but steady progress in 
the study of social exclusion suggests that the social consequences of social 
exclusion can no longer be neglected. Research on social exclusion is needed to 
identify some of the most important issues during the rapid social and economic 
changes. They are also necessary for policy makers for future policy 
development. 
 
This paper tries to answer three questions. First, regardless of the political 
sensitivity attached to social exclusion, is social exclusion a new phenomenon 
in China? Secondly, what does social exclusion mean in the context of 
contemporary China, i.e. a developing country going through major socio-
economic transformations? Thirdly, what can the study of social exclusion in 
China contribute to the overall picture of social exclusion in the world? 
 
Searching for a working definition 
Social exclusion is a “contested idea” (Hills, 2002) even in European countries, 
where the term was first introduced to social policy studies. This is not a term 
that is readily used in research on China. So far, the most widely quoted 
definition in the Chinese literature is the one used by the Social Exclusion Unit 
of Britain: 
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Social exclusion is a shorthand term for what can happen when 
people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such 
as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high 
crime environments, bad health and family breakdown (The Social 
Exclusion Unit). 
The reason that this definition has attracted more attention than other definitions 
is because the British government (for example DFID) and some academic 
research units (such as IDS) have funded a number of research projects on 
poverty and other social policy issues in China. What is more, the definition is 
practical and, at the same time, leaves room for interpretation across countries. 
As emphasized by the Social Exclusion Unit, social exclusion is related to the 
lack of coordination between different policies and policy units; therefore, the 
socially excluded can be a small group of people, a neighbourhood or an area 
that is “left out” by the overall policy structure.  
 
So far in the Chinese literature, social exclusion mainly covers people living in 
long-term poverty and looks at the interaction between the majority and the 
minority, the mainstream and the marginalized, as well as the rich and the poor 
(Sun, 2002a; Tang, 2002). For example, although Tang (2002) starts from the 
concept of social exclusion, the discussion is very much limited to households 
that suffer from basic poverty. The states of these individuals or families such as 
living under bare subsistence, not being able to afford healthcare and education, 
and not being sociable, as discussed by Tang, are ultimately “economic 
destitution”.  
 
However, the definition of social exclusion, shaped in the European socio-
economic context, overlooks some important features of developing countries 
when adopted without any “added value” (Kabeer, 2000; de Haan, and 
Maxwell, 1998). The British experiences suggest that the socially excluded are 
vulnerable, powerless and voiceless, but NOT the majority in terms of the 
population. Gore (1994) points out that unlike developed countries, poverty is a 
mass phenomenon rather than a small “underclass” in developing countries. 
Neglecting the differences between developed and developing countries might 
lead to failure in addressing the main issues that are faced by large groups or 
even the majority of the population and only pay attention to the minority that 
are vulnerable only to a less extent. Similarly focusing on the minor, 
marginalized and long-term poor has limited the analytical power of the concept 
of social exclusion in China.  
 
First, despite of the recent rapid economic growth, the percentage of the 
vulnerable, powerless and voiceless who stay in or fall into poverty remains 
very high. According to the official data announced by the Poverty Relief 
Office of the State Council, PRC, 3 per cent of the rural population are living in 
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absolute poverty and 10 per cent in relative poverty. Urban poverty is rising 
rapidly (Hong, 2003; Zhu, 2002). 
Secondly, the market-oriented legal and policy frameworks are still under 
construction and are subject to change. In the Central Planning era, the dual 
system divided urban and rural areas, with the majority (80%) of the total 
population living in rural areas. It is hard to tell who were actually in the 
“mainstream” and who were the marginalized, although the urban-centric view 
would prefer to claim an urban dominance. Nowadays, the old dual system still 
affects many aspects of the society. But the socio-economic scene is fairly 
changeable. The percentages of the vulnerable, powerless and voiceless people 
may not be reduced but the overall composition changes over time (Lu, 2002). 
On the one hand, reforms have integrated people in the “improved” policy 
frameworks; on the other hand, reforms also create new “left-outs” while 
“redefining the rules of games” (Tang, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, the social network and the traditions of family support have made the 
poorest not necessarily completely supportless, at least in the short-term (Sun, 
2002). However, there are groups of people who are not necessarily poor in 
terms of income, or can cope at the moment, but subject to potential deprivation 
in the prevailing institutional arrangements. Sun (2002a) discusses the social 
exclusion that the urban unemployed will have to face in the years to come. 
 
A definition of the United Nations Development Program attempts to include 
social exclusion in both developed and developing countries. Social exclusion is 
defined as lack of recognition of basic rights, or where there is recognition, lack 
of access to political and legal systems necessary to realise the rights 
(Burchardt, et al., 2002). More than a fashionable way of talking about poverty 
or a simple subset of the poor, it does not only include the people who are left 
out of a certain realm of the society (or marginalized), but also the people who 
are rejected from participation either legally or politically. These people are not 
necessarily the poorest among the poor. But their being denied political, social 
and economic rights may put them in a very vulnerable position and under 
constant threats to their life and property. 
 
The following sections will make use of a framework based on the political, 
economic and social rights to: 
1)  trace the history and root of social exclusion in China since 1949; 
2)  briefly look at social exclusion in China since the beginning of economic 
reforms; and  
3)  use the framework to analyse a particular case of social exclusion in 
urban China: rural workers in urban areas. 
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Pre-reform period (1949-1978) 
The central planning economy came to an end in 1978. In the pre-reform period, 
economic activities were dominated and governed by the state and collective 
sectors. Because of shortages in resources and the state’s determination to 
support industrial accumulation, especially in heavy industries, individual 
income was kept at a minimum (Lin, et al., 1994). In this system, income was 
fairly equal and there was not much room for a person to strive to achieve 
higher income and higher living standards than the rest. It is quite easy to come 
to the conclusion that in this highly redistributive and “equal” society, social 
exclusion did not exist. However, one need consider the way that the set of 
references that people used to distinguish “them” from “us” was different from 
that in market economy. If we look at the political, social and economic factors, 
the claim that leads to “no social exclusion” is not justified as it appears to be. 
 
Political factors 
In 1949, the new Communist government wanted to put domestic disputes and 
overseas pressure under control very quickly. A political system based on class 
struggle was quickly established (Kraus, 1983). Workers as the ruling class 
were united with peasants and soldiers. Capitalists (in urban areas) and 
landowners and rich farmers were to be suppressed (in rural areas), and 
intellectuals were to be kept at a distance. In this class system, everyone had a 
label in his or her personal archives, which were kept by their work units or the 
local government. Women were labelled according to their husbands’ social 
classes and children inherited their parents’ labels.  
 
Labels were useful in many circumstances. Politically, people with “bad” labels 
were not allowed to join the Communist Party. Labels were used to launch 
harsh strikes over “bad” classes in the series of political campaigns from the 
early 1950s to the late 1970s. Economically and socially, these labels were 
crucial in terms of employment, education, and even welfare provision. For 
example, children from “bourgeois” families were not allowed to go to good 
schools. In the 1970s when the “Cultural Revolution” reached its peak, young 
people with “bad roots” were deprived of the opportunity to attend universities. 
Because the authorities were responsible for allocating jobs, a “good root” may 
lead to a more desirable job. In urban areas, family members could inherit their 
partner or parents’ jobs after they retired, which could be desirable jobs but not 
available to the other people without these connections. As to housing, the most 
important welfare provision during the planning era, a good background was 
clearly useful for better housing. When looked closely, even the “good” people 
were treated differently. Communist party members could enjoy better welfare 
and had better chances to voice their needs (Walder, 1986, Bian, et al., 2001). 
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Economic factors 
Having been sapped by the long lasting wars, the economic basis of China in 
the early 1950s was very weak. People were living in bare subsistence. There 
was a clear intention to develop heavy industry to maintain self-sufficiency and 
improve military defence by the state. This strategy led to a dual system in 
which urban areas served as the core of the economy and rural areas the support 
(Lin, et al., 1994). As a result, rural labour costs were strictly controlled. 
Farmers received minimised wage. The purpose was to provide food and raw 
materials for urban people at as low a cost as possible. Rural residents were not 
covered by the state welfare system. They were expected to rely on family to 
provide basic and practical assistance. In some special circumstances, such as 
basic healthcare, some support could be obtained at the community level (in the 
villages) or from urban volunteers (such as the “bare foot doctors”). 
 
In urban areas, a welfare system was designed to minimise labour costs. Urban 
employees could only receive very low wages and get in kind benefits from the 
state through their work units. These benefits covered various basic needs, such 
as food, clothes, heating, healthcare, housing, pension, and childcare. People 
without work units would not be able to enjoy benefits as such. Some work 
units did not have the capacity to offer welfare to the employees (usually very 
small state factories or collectively owned factories). In such cases the local 
government took up the responsibility to provide benefits to the employees. 
 
All these benefits were available only to urban residents. To distinguish urban 
people from rural people, permanent urban residency (hukou or registration) 
became a crucial document for urban administration. Urban residents should 
present Hukou in many occasions, from receiving food and clothes vouchers, to 
school registration. 
 
The state strictly limited labour mobility. Local governments were ready to 
enforce the labour control policies, as with their limited budgets they were 
reluctant to hand out benefits to “outsiders”. Hukou was used to control labour 
mobility across the country. Local police kept the Hukou information of each 
local resident, and employers held archives for all employees. The archives 
recorded each person’s political, schooling and working histories. Employees 
had no access to their archives. The files only moved among employers. A 
person without official approval (of Hukou and archive transfers) would not be 
able to get registered in another city or even move to another job in the same 
city. If a work unit (even in the same city) was willing to hire a person, whether 
the recruitment could be realised depended on his previous work unit’s 
willingness to “release” the archives. Even if there might be some collectively 
owned factories that would like to offer an informal job, the person would not 
be eligible to any benefits. The low wage system and non-existence of private 
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market made it almost impossible for individuals to obtain from other sources 
the necessities distributed as state benefits. Thus, the people outside the system 
would not be treated as the majority were. Once falling out of the system, there 
would be little hope to get back again. 
 
Social factors 
The emphasis on comprehensive control and the scale of the operations 
demanded extremely efficient planning and administration. However, shortage 
in resources and technology made it impossible for the Central Government to 
obtain sufficient information about the periphery. However, there were ways to 
reduce the burden of the government. The first is work-based provision. As 
mentioned earlier, people without a job were “naturally” discounted. The 
second is male oriented provision. It was assumed that all the people would get 
married. Therefore, only one family member was reviewed for the eligibility of 
benefits. Gradually, the practice had been taken for granted that women, 
unmarried single men and women would not be considered for housing 
provision as well as some other benefits (Lic, 2002). 
 
Social Exclusion 
The political, social and economic factors had all contributed to a planned 
socio-economic system in which people were treated differently. The system set 
the boundary between “insiders” and “outsiders”. Outsiders could not join 
insiders even if they were willing to. Social exclusion existed in four 
dimensions. First, urban society was not opened to rural residents. The latter did 
not enjoy the benefits that were available to urban residents. Secondly, 
politically “bad” people were deprived of many social rights that were enjoyed 
by the rest of the society. Thirdly, people were left out (exposed) by the system 
because of the strict control over job and welfare allocation. Finally, people who 
fell out of the system by moving to an area or sector to which they didn’t 
“belong” administratively meant the system would no longer cover them as 
before.  
 
Post-reform period 
Reforms removed many controls of the planning era. Many rules were rewritten 
and the boundaries of responsibilities redefined. China adopted a gradual reform 
approach right from the beginning. It means the government did not abandon 
the earlier policies overnight. The reforms have so far lasted for more than 25 
years and have not yet ended.  
 
With the on-going economic transition, the problems of social exclusion also 
change. First, reforms have included some previously excluded people and 
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excluded some previously included people. Clearly, a fairly large proportion of 
the population are not yet included in the “mainstream”, i.e. the part of the 
society that follows actively during the rapid changes and thrive on the long 
lasting economic growth or protected by the newly evolved social safety-net. 
Secondly, the ongoing reforms may eliminate some forms of exclusion, which 
was generated not long ago.  
 
Many people argue that since the reforms are gradual and trial-and-error based, 
policies will become increasingly inclusive (Tang, 2002). However, this view 
should not discredit the attempt to examine the exclusion generating factors. So 
far, social exclusion (or inclusion) has not yet been a policy concern. Even the 
intention to tackle policies that may lead to exclusion is absent, not to mention 
using socially exclusion as a comprehensive approach to look at the situation of 
disadvantaged people. Social exclusion potentially has long-term effect on the 
people affected. By identifying the exclusion inducing factors in a policy or a 
set of policies and the people who are “left out” in each reshuffling of rule of 
the game, we can work out who are the ones that need to be “picked up” and 
what can help people to avoid getting socially excluded. 
 
To identify the exclusion inducing factors, we need to look at the sequence of 
reforms that have taken place in China in the last twenty-five years. The reforms 
began in rural areas. They were then not the “kernel” of the economy. The 
household responsibility system, which began to allow rural households to take 
charge of their own land and agricultural activities, had enhanced work 
incentives and productivity of farmers. The urban private sector reform 
followed soon. Initially, private enterprises gained the right to co-exist with 
collective and state enterprises. Then, rural township enterprises were 
encouraged to develop. Later, state enterprises started to operate like real 
enterprises, i.e. profit driven and with autonomy. At the same time, price 
controls were largely removed. Thus, markets for many products and materials 
evolved. In the same period, the state also gradually removed wage controls in 
urban areas. These reforms overlapped with each other in time but the general 
principle was to gradually let the market function and allow market prices 
(including prices for commodities and labour) to adjust the balance between 
demand and supply and achieve greater economic efficiency. The most recent 
reforms focus on the urban social welfare system.  
 
The reforms aimed at replacing a centrally controlled system with a market 
system. The theoretic support for such changes was government failure and the 
belief in the market’s magic power to remove all the inefficiencies in the system 
and boost economic growth. As a result of these reforms, the economy has 
grown continuously at very high speed around 7 to 12 percent per year for more 
than 15 years. However, has economic growth generated an inclusive society in 
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which people have equal opportunities to be financially better off? In the 
following sections, I focus on the changing vista of social exclusion in China. I 
argue that the political, social and economic factors continue to generate social 
exclusion but in a rather different context. 
 
Political privileges and voicelessness 
The old social class structure based on class contradiction and struggle became 
obsolete after the Cultural Revolution ended. Gradually, a new class structure 
based on the new socio-economic system started to evolve. However, there 
were very few researches on what was the new structure and how it came into 
existence. In 2001, partly encouraged by the state to write up new political 
theory to support further reform, i.e. the campaign for capitalists to join the 
Communist Party, a number of scholars started to examine the social 
stratifications in the 1990s (Lu, 2002; Xu, 2002; Zheng, 2002; Sun, 2002b, 
2002c; Lib, 2002). Li (1993) categorises the Chinese society into 5 social classes 
according to occupations. They are farmers, workers, intelligentsia, managers 
and private entrepreneurs. According to Lu (2002) and Li and Zhao (1999), 
income and wealth are also key factors in deciding China’s social strata.  
 
A further attempt is to “rank” the existing social classes. Rather than ranking the 
social classes according to their political connections to the working class,1 the 
new ranking practices sort out social classes according to wealth and income 
levels of different social groups. Apart from financial wellbeing, second order 
factors, such as political power, social capital, and education, are considered 
crucial to the acquirement of greater income or wealth. Lib (2003) suggests that 
there is a transition from political inequalities to economic inequalities in China 
in the last two decades. He argues that the serious political discrimination in the 
pre-reform period was accompanied by relatively small economic inequalities. 
Later, political inequalities were gradually replaced with economic inequalities. 
The narrowed political differences between different social classes partially 
compensated for the shock of economic disparity. 
 
However, this argument did not examine the interactions between social and 
political differences and also the possible changes in the features of political 
differences. Earlier political discriminations were based on explicit deprivation 
of political and social rights of some social classes. In contrast, new class 
                                                
1
  Although Mao (Mao, 1926) also analysed the economic forces that drove different 
classes to stay close or far away from the working class, he didn’t really try to look at 
the relationship between the political stances and the economic status of the social 
classes in a dynamic way. Therefore, the possible breakage and reorganisation of the 
political partnerships among different social classes when economic conditions 
changes were left out in his argument. 
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divisions root in the lack of mechanisms for disadvantaged groups to voice their 
need or complaints in the new system. In the post reform period, some people 
(those who have control over organisational, educational and economic 
resources, see Figure 1) can enjoy privileges and impose strong influences over 
decision makers (Lu, 2002). For example, public sector employees (high in 
administrative level, well educated) as beneficiaries to the reform are able to 
force through policies for them to get even higher pay or benefits than the rest 
of the society (Gong and Li, 2003). At the same time, there is a serious lack of 
institutionalised channels for the underclass to voice their opinions. According 
to Lu’s survey (2002), urban manual workers, rural labourers and the 
unemployed are at the bottom of the society. They have very little resources and 
enjoy less protection than the other social groups. The problems are not only 
limited to the economic situation of these social classes. They become voiceless 
or have to depend on the sympathy of other social groups to voice their needs. 
Quite often, they are merely neglected. 
 
Economic opportunities and inequalities 
In spite of increases in income, at the bottom end of the income distribution, 
people still live in extreme poverty.  
 
PROFILES OF POVERTY 
Extreme poverty has never been eliminated. On the contrary, it is getting more 
noticeable in urban areas.  
 
In the early 1980s, the rural reform quickly improved the living standards of 
rural households in some areas. The most rapid changes happened between 
1978 and 1984. The incidence of poverty reduced from 33 percent to 11 percent 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1998). Income per capital increased by 15 per cent 
every year. The number of rural poor fell from 260 million to 89 million. 
However, the speed of improvement did not hold. From 1985 to 1988, the 
annual income growth was 5 per cent and further reduced to 2 per cent during 
1988-1991 (Lu, 2001). The progress in rural areas was soon shadowed by urban 
reforms (Fan, et al., 2000). Up to now, many areas fail to improve and a large 
proportion of rural population still lives in poverty. There are also people living 
slightly above or under the poverty line. They fell into deeper poverty fairly 
easily and temporarily because of unexpected risks such as natural disasters, bad 
harvest, or shortage of working capital (Jalan and Ravallion, 2000, 1998). 
 
In urban areas, there are people who never managed to lift their living standard 
to a much higher level (Wu, 2002). In particular, the disabled, the long-term 
sick and the elderly who cannot get support from their family members. 
However, in the 1990s, the “new poor” (Knight, 2000) who have lost their jobs 
or simply could not earn enough to support their own families or the urban 
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migrants2 who survive around the poverty line become increasingly noticeable 
in urban areas. Some people can get out of poverty fairly quickly through 
moving to new jobs or start their own businesses or even move to different 
areas. However, others find it difficult to cope on their own. They are trapped 
and remain to be poor. 
 
Statistics tells conflicting stories about the urban poor. So far, rural migrants to 
urban areas are not included in urban population, as they are not registered as 
urban residents. Even if we do not consider these people, the researchers have 
very different estimates of the population of urban poor (Hussain, 2003; Lia, 
2001; Khan, 1998; Li and Gustafson, 1996). The most frequently quoted 
number, “14-15 million”, is the estimate of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the 
National Statistics Bureau and All China Trade Union in the surveys carried out 
independently during 1999-2000. However, many researchers argue that this 
number underestimates the actual poverty situation in urban China (Tang, 
2002).  
 
Income inequality 
The rural-urban income disparity has increased and is seriously underestimated 
in the official statistics. According to China Statistics Yearbook, in 2001, the 
average income of urban residents was RMB6860 yuan and that of rural 
residents was RMB2366 yuan. The ratio of urban to rural incomes was used as a 
measurement for income disparity, which is about 3:1 (see Figure 3). However, 
although both are labelled as “income”, it has very different meanings to urban 
and rural residents. 40 per cent of farmers’ income was in the form of farm 
produce. If this 40 per cent was deducted, the monthly income of farmers 
reduced to about RMB150 yuan only. Farmers usually used around 20 per cent 
of this 150 yuan to reinvest in next year’s production. Thus the disposable 
income becomes much less than what the official statistics actually suggested. 
In contrast, urban residents have, on average, 600-yuan income in cash. If urban 
welfare and grey incomes were all included, the ratio between the income of 
urban and rural residents can be as high as 6:1 (Qiu, 2002). 
 
Apart from the historical division between rural and urban areas, the division 
between different social groups have developed new features. In the earlier 
stages, the most obvious division is between the insiders and the outsiders of 
“the system”, the core of the economy that remain unchanged since the reform. 
It is the result of the gradual reform starting from the periphery of “the system”, 
                                                
2
  Hussain (2003) points out the unclear status of the rural migrants who work and live 
in the urban areas but filed as rural residents. They are not counted as the urban 
residents in the official statistics in China. However, they do not live in the rural areas 
nor do agricultural related jobs.  
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i.e. from rural areas, to private sectors, to collective sectors, to small 
enterprises.3 As reforms continue, the core is getting smaller and smaller. People 
in the core are protected by “the system”. They continue to enjoy benefits that 
were available in the pre-reform period, such as job security, fixed pay and 
various types of occupational welfare. They are “insiders”. The rest are 
“outsiders”. Outside the system, there is no control over wage income. Floating 
and unequal pay is encouraged to reward better performance. In the early stages 
of the reform, outsiders did not have any social protection. More recently, 
private sector employees started to enjoy urban social welfare through 
contribution. Up to now, except for civil servants and some of giant state 
enterprise employees, all urban employees are supposed to be covered by 
contribution based welfare schemes, ranging from pension, health insurance and 
housing provident funds.  
 
In this sense, outsiders are further divided into two (or even more) layers. The 
majority of urban employees are in the new system, which is outside the old 
core. People working for enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy are officially 
covered by the work based welfare system. However, they cannot receive the 
promised level of welfare. The unemployed and rural residents are pushed 
further out and become marginalized. The only real insiders are civil servants 
who continue to enjoy old style benefits. Figure 2 shows the shifting ground for 
the poor. The society is getting more stratified as a result of economic reforms. 
 
UNEQUAL ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The further exploration of poverty and income gaps in China reveals an unequal 
access to resources and opportunities. For many years, the doctrine of free 
economy seems to be the touchstone for prosperity. People who become well 
off in the reforms are inspirations for millions to follow suit. China seems to 
have become the land of opportunities. Clearly, this is all about urban China. 
More accurately, some people get rich first as “allowed” by Deng’s 
Administration. However, after more than two decades, people start to question 
the side effects of gradual reforms. When some people get richer and richer, 
how about the others? Can the rest really become rich in the same way, through 
open competition in the market?  
 
Lu (2002) analyses the relationship between social classes and resources. He 
points out that political power (political resources), education (human 
resources) and economic resources are the key factors that influence the 
potential of individuals to become better off in the Chinese society. According 
                                                
3
  The gradual reform is also referred to as the “easy to hard reform sequence”. “It 
addresses the easy problems first and leaves the hard ones until later” (Yueh, 2003). 
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to his class ranking, rural workers without protection, peasants, unemployed or 
half employed have become the underclass. They do not have sufficient 
resources of any of the three types and have little access to the opportunities that 
are available to the upper social classes.  
 
There is also research on the mobility of underclass people along the social 
ladder. Benjamin, et al. (2001) has two relevant conclusions. First, “economic 
opportunity” determines the relative positions of the winners and losers in 
transition. Second, human capital is crucial in allowing households to access 
these opportunities. Further more, they find that:  
Inequality of economic development interacts with the unequal 
distribution of human capital, leading to more inequality within 
villages than differences of income across villages... Given the 
current distribution of education, many of these institutional 
developments will disproportionately benefit the higher educated. 
Compounding this, current patterns of capital accumulation suggest 
that the rich will be better positioned to increase their incomes, and 
thus their future wealth (Benjamin, et al., 2001). 
In urban areas, the most widely addressed issue is unequal opportunities in 
education. With the growing awareness of the positive correlations between 
educational level and the opportunity to obtain higher income, issues related to 
unequal access to education across regions has been regarded as a crucial 
challenge that China has to face for further development (Chen and Wang, 
2001).  
 
Partly related to education, opportunities to work are also different for people 
from different backgrounds. The most widely discussed is the social control 
mechanism, the Hukou system. It was put in use from the 1950s to restrict 
labour mobility. However, economic reforms in the urban areas failed to 
challenge the legitimacy of the urban Hukou system until quite recently. On the 
one hand, local governments and police use the requirement for registration to 
check rural labourers. The latter can be driven out of the local labour market or 
even the cities whenever local governments want. Such actions were often 
justified by the argument of local job losses and deterioration of local public 
safety. Registration ensures that only local residents can enjoy social benefits, 
such as housing, pension and healthcare. In recent years, with the marketization 
of many social services, migrants can get part of these services by paying 
market prices. But because rural labourers are not considered local residents, 
they do not enjoy any political rights, such as voting or claiming compensations 
when they suffer from injuries. Quite often, their wages are not paid on time or 
they are forced to work extra long hours. There are no trade unions to protect 
them (Yao, 2001). In this way, the Hukou system enforces the division between 
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urban residents and newcomers and allows discriminations by local 
governments, urban residents and employers. 
 
In all, people are differentiated with their political and social backgrounds, 
origin and education. Those at the bottom end of the economy have little access 
to resources and related opportunities, which are necessary to escape poverty. 
Meanwhile, the limited access to resources and opportunities of some people 
co-exist with the advantages for the rich or powerful ones through corruption 
(Lia, 2002, Johnston, 2001; Fan and Grossman, 2001; Lib, 2001) and even 
policy guidance (Gong and Li, 2003). 
 
Social protection and vulnerability 
Economic reforms in China have broken the rigid divisions between urban and 
rural areas in the way that people who were outside the state welfare system 
have the opportunities to survive in urban areas with market supply. Meanwhile, 
several groups of people became completely uncovered by the policies and 
marginalised in the society. 
 
THE NEWLY INCLUDED 
In terms of social services and public goods, public and private provisions and 
various derived forms of provisions exist at the same time. Individuals and 
households can have more choices. For example, instead of waiting for 
employers to offer public houses,4 employees can buy their own houses in the 
private market; parents can pay for private education or pay market price to 
study in the desired public schools.  
 
But the effects can be mixed. On the one hand, the originally excluded, such as 
migrants, can obtain private services at market prices that are higher than the 
state controlled prices. However, a precondition for paying market price is 
financial affordability, i.e. wealthier people can buy their way through market 
and become included in the sense that they can enjoy the necessary social 
services to maintain livelihood in urban areas. On the other hand, the poor (such 
as rural residents and the majority of urban migrants) who cannot afford private 
services continue to be excluded by “the system”.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, with the withdrawal of universal welfare to urban 
residents and the establishment of social pooling and contribution-based 
welfare, rural residents together with the other members of the “under-class” 
were increasingly exposed to various risks generated by the market. 
                                                
4
  Before the comprehensive housing reform in the 1998. 
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The most recent reforms required employers not to act as direct providers and 
administrators of in kind benefits. However, employers still undertake important 
responsibilities such as delivery of cash benefits via forced saving schemes, i.e. 
individual accounts. Since these accounts do not target households but 
individuals, women and unmarried employees stop being excluded from the 
welfare system.  
 
THE NEWLY EXCLUDED 
However, the pro-growth economic strategy fails to establish, especially in the 
private sector, effective labour protection. Local governments and policy 
makers are often more willing to protect investors rather than protecting the 
basic working conditions of the employees. Rural labourers, women and 
children often become the victims of employer exploitation (Wiseman, 2001; 
Pringle, 2001; Chan, 2001; ADB, 2002).  
 
The attempt to improve enterprise efficiency, especially in the state sector, has 
resulted in serious urban unemployment. Many state enterprise employees had 
received low wages in the hope of lifetime welfare protection. Since the reform, 
it is not rare that an employee is dismissed from his/her job getting little 
compensation. They are “laid off (xiagang)” workers. It means, administratively 
they still attach to their employers and can enjoy the in kind benefits as they did 
before. However, many enterprises went bankrupt since the reform. Quite often, 
laid-off workers lost their “work units (danwei, workplace)” and subsequently, 
the benefits. Even for the surviving enterprises, the market pressure prevents 
them from offering benefits to the laid-off workers as they did before. 
According to the newly established welfare schemes, individuals have to 
contribute to individual accounts in order to receive pension and healthcare in 
the future. Laid-off workers and the unemployed are not able to contribute to 
their own accounts. In the future, they will not be able to receive benefits (Sun, 
2002a).  
 
In general, the economic reforms have redefined the roles of the state, the 
market and the society. Unlike the United Kingdom, social exclusion in China 
bears more features of a developing country in the process of changing from 
state planning to market economy. Compared to poverty, social exclusion does 
not only involve the poor or subgroups of the poor, but also the lack of 
enforceable civil and social rights—such as the right to voice their needs, equal 
access to resources and opportunities and equal social welfare treatment—for 
the whole population.  
 
The next section focuses on a new form of social exclusion that is challenging 
the existing political, social and economic establishment. I will continue to use 
the framework proposed earlier to analyse the case in greater details. 
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Rural-urban conflicts—rural workers in cities 
This section looks at rural workers in urban China. The term “rural worker” is 
used to describe the farmers who give up agricultural activities and went to 
urban areas to work. They are not urban citizens. In some published papers and 
documents, they are called “migrant workers”. However, urban migration in 
China is not limited to rural-urban migration. There are also a lot of people 
moving between different urban areas, such as university graduates living in 
large cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen and new working migrants 
moving between urban areas. This paper focuses on people from rural areas 
only. I use the term “rural worker(s)” for this specific type of migrants.  
 
The trend and reasons of rural labour mobility in post-reform China 
In the late 1970s when the economic reform started, farmers began to leave the 
farmland and look for non-agricultural jobs outside their hometown. Figure 4 
shows that at the end of 2001, more than one third of the rural labour force 
worked in non-agricultural sectors. The average growth rate since the late 1990s 
is 8-10 million people per year. According to a survey by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, in 2001, it is estimated (conservatively) that there are altogether 78 
million people working outside their hometown, 15 per cent more than the year 
before. The expected growth for 2001-2005 is 5 million to 6 million per year 
(Hu, 2002).  
 
Why do so many rural labourers want to go to cities? Socio-economic changes 
since the reforms have provided several good reasons and opportunities for 
farmers to give up agricultural activities (Huang, 1996; Hare, 1999). First, the 
size of farmland per capita is too small in the agricultural sector. Even before 
the reform, rural labour was under-employed. Although they worked in rural 
areas, there was not enough work for them to do and the productivity was very 
low. The Household Responsibility System allowed individual households to be 
in charge of their production and keep the proceeds of each year’s production. It 
greatly enhanced the productivity of the agricultural sector and farmers’ work 
incentives. As a result, one person can be much more productive than before 
and many farmers became “useless” and redundant in their hometown. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, up to now, there are 480 million 
people in the rural labour force, among which 320 million work in the 
agricultural sector. However, the actual demand for labour in rural areas is only 
170 million persons. About 150 million persons are redundant.5  
                                                
5
  The number is only a rough estimation. There are different estimates. OECD (2002, 
p522) is less optimistic than the Ministry of Agriculture, PRC. In 1999, if the GDP 
contribution per worker employed in farming were equal to the average for non-
agricultural work, the rural hidden unemployment reaches around 250 million. If the 
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Secondly, the profit rate for traditional agriculture, especially farming, is very 
low. In contrast, income levels of urban employees are much higher (see Figure 
3). Farmers realise that it is easier to earn money in urban areas. One or two 
persons working in the city can support a whole family back at home. In 2002, 
the total amount of money earned by the rural workers in urban areas was 
RMB527, 800 million yuan, in which RMB327,400 million yuan was sent by 
post or carried in cash to home (People’s Daily, 03-04-2003).  
 
Thirdly, despite the barriers to settle down in cities, the overall control of labour 
migrants is less tight than before. In the planned era, urban residents were 
attached to their work units and received various benefits from the state directly 
or indirectly. However, rural residents could not enjoy these benefits even if 
they lived in urban areas. In this way, the old system prevented rural residents 
from staying in urban areas. Later, some restrictions were gradually lifted; some 
are still in effect. Generally speaking, the barriers to live and work in urban 
areas are easier to overcome than before.  
 
Fourthly, since the reform, China has adopted export-oriented industrial 
strategy. Many manufacturers are eager to use cheaper labour to compete in the 
world market. Urban employers are happy to hire rural workers who are ready 
to work hard and willing to settle with low salaries. At the same time, many 
rural areas set up township enterprises that are collectively owned. These 
township enterprises locate in the rural areas but are engaged in industrial 
productions. They often hire workers from nearby rural areas. These enterprises 
have offered sound opportunities for rural workers to leave the farmland. With 
experience in township enterprises, rural workers often perceive the 
opportunities in larger cities that are further away from their hometown.  
 
Fifthly, the rural reform changes farmers’ thinking. In the past, “digging food 
from the soil” was regarded as the proper way of rural life. Later, highlighted 
materialistic dreams and open encouragement for pursuing affluence have 
created strong incentives for farmers to seek greater financial rewards for their 
work. Nowadays, many rural workers who give up their life in rural areas are 
not necessarily redundant labour. Many of them do not want to be tied up by 
farming Quite often, they are stimulated by the “glory” of their town folks’ 
stories of success in cities and cannot wait to wet their own hands in the waves 
of economic prosperity. As time moves on, many become used to work in urban 
areas and are not willing to take up farming anymore (Wang, 2003). 
 
                                                                                                                               
GDP contribution per worker in agriculture is set at a modest 50 per cent of the non-
agricultural level, the estimate of hidden unemployment declines to 200 million. 
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Rural workers and urban social exclusion 
However, it has never been easy for rural workers to settle down in urban areas. 
They are from the outside and considered to be “inferior” to local residents, and 
are so treated. As more rural workers come to the cities, the disturbing treatment 
that they have to face and the conflicts between rural workers and urban 
residents become more noticeable. Rural workers have to face several major 
problems when they come into the cities. 
 
HUKOU, CITIZEN’S RIGHTS AND VOICELESSNESS 
As discussed earlier, Hukou prevents rural people from staying in big cities 
permanently. It was originally designed to keep tight control of labour mobility 
during the central planning period.6 Before the reform, without an urban Hukou, 
people from the “outside” including rural areas and other cities could not move 
and live in a city freely. Over the years, although control of urban labour 
mobility becomes less tight, the differential treatment through the Hukou system 
remains unchanged (Mao, 2003; Lic, 2003).  
 
Identification, eviction and little support 
Rural workers are required to obtain various certificates before they can start 
working and living in urban areas. When they are in cities, rural workers should 
present on spot temporary residency (zanzhuzheng), work permit 
(dagongzheng) and ID (shenfenzheng) upon requirement. Failure to show the 
required documents means arrest or even eviction. The legal basis for spot-
checking is a regulation issued by the State Council, “Administrative Measures 
on Arresting and Eviction of Urban Vagrants and Beggars” (State Council, 
1982). According to this regulation, all the cities should set up “Arrest and 
Eviction Stations” (AES, shourong qiansong zhan) targeting rural residents 
begging in cities, urban residents as vagrants and beggars and other homeless 
people. The AES should check the ID of these people and send them back to the 
places where their Hukou was registered. The regulation had been effective 
since 1982. In practice, local police set up the AES. Policemen patrolled the 
streets every day. Rural workers who failed to present the required documents 
were arrested, evicted, or sent for forced labour. 
 
On 20 June 2003, the 1982-regulation, which had become the nightmare of rural 
workers for more than 20 years, was finally replaced with a new regulation, 
“Administrative Measures on Helping and Administration of Poor Urban 
Vagrants and Beggars (Draft)” (State Council, 2003). According to the new 
regulation, the poor people and those who have to live in the street and depend 
on begging should be advised to go to Help Centres. Help Centres should: 
                                                
6
  The earliest Hukou system was adopted in 1958. 
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1)  provide food up to the food standard regulations; 
2)  provide accommodation that can meet basic requirements; 
3)  send emergency patients to hospital in time; 
4)  help these people to contact their families or relatives or employers; and  
5)  if necessary, provide travel tickets for them to go back to their home or 
work places. 
The new regulation does not grant police the right to arrest and evict rural 
residents. It emphasises on helping and supporting the poor regardless of their 
origins. The new regulation offers social benefits for the vagrants and beggars 
living in urban areas. However, the new regulation has no intention to set up 
similar institutions in rural areas. Even though “residency” stops to be a 
defining standard for entitlement, it continues to acknowledge the division 
between urban and rural areas.  
 
Urban citizens’ discriminatory actions 
Urban residents can easily identify rural workers, especially the new comers, 
through their behaviour, accents and clothes. The majority of rural workers are 
employed for manual jobs.7 They often wear old and dirty clothes. They have to 
live in low-cost houses that naturally segregate them from urban residents, 
especially the urban middle class. Urban residents often consider themselves 
superior to rural workers. It is not uncommon that some urban residents bully or 
mock rural workers in public (Lic, 2003). Rural workers are not welcomed or 
even forbidden in many public places. One most reported occasion is public 
transportation. Many bus drivers and conductors in large cities refuse to let rural 
workers get on. In Qingdao, some citizens suggested to set special seats for the 
rural workers’ on the buses so that they can be separated from urban citizens. In 
Beijing, some public toilets collect fines if rural workers are found using them 
(Cai, 2002; Yang, 2002).  
 
Rural workers are also blamed for increased crime rate in urban areas. Urban 
residents think rural workers show no respect for public order and threaten 
public security by stealing and robbing. However, little attention is paid to the 
causes of these crimes. The discriminatory treatment received by rural workers 
has become a major source of anger. Some researches suggest that many crimes 
committed by rural workers resulted from unfair treatment (Lic, 2003; Zhao, 
2001). One cannot claim that all the criminal offences of rural workers are 
because of unfair treatment, but when urban residents blame rural workers for 
                                                
7
  According to Lid (2003), 41.4 per cent of rural workers work in construction industry. 
There are also rural workers in industrial enterprises, government agencies, schools 
and hospitals as labourers (31.6 per cent). Another 19.2 per cent work in catering 
services such as hotels, restaurants, tailor’s shops, electronic and machinery 
reparation stores. 
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various social problems, they are not aware of the serious discrimination against 
rural workers.  
 
Discriminatory policy implementation 
What causes more concern is the discriminatory or even brutal treatment by 
some civil servants or local police towards rural workers during daily policy 
implementations.  
 
In cities, urban residents do not carry ID or work permits. However, rural 
workers or “outsiders” should present on spot all documents upon requirement. 
Failing to do so, a rural worker may end up getting arrested and sent back to 
hometown or to do forced labour work. As shown in the earlier sections, this 
regulation was only abandoned officially very recently. Before the regulation 
was withdrawn, it allowed urban police to inspect passers-by in the street or 
carry out home inspections without prior notice (Lia, 2003). Some unqualified 
government officials or policemen abused their power and took advantage of 
helpless rural workers (Lia, 2003). However, if the abused rural workers sought 
legal protection, they often faced harassments (Sun, 2002; Zou, 1996). The 
withdrawal of the regulation on arrest and eviction has received wide support. 
However, it cannot prevent rural workers from other forms of discriminatory 
treatment. 
 
Lack of representation in the political system 
In recent years, a democratic election system in rural China at the grass root 
level has been developed. It means rural representatives and village leaders are 
elected from the candidates nominated by rural residents. In this way, there is a 
formal channel to transmit farmers’ voices to the higher authorities. Although 
the bottom up election system has a lot of loopholes and is subject to 
manipulations, the grass-root level election is, to a greater degree than the urban 
election system, able to reflect local interests at the local level (Zhang, et al., 
2002; Schubert, 2002; Paster and Tan, 2000). However, although rural workers 
can vote in their hometowns, since they spend most of the time living outside 
rural areas, they have very different interests from the local residents in their 
hometown (Southern City Daily, 2003). 
 
In urban areas, local representatives are local urban residents. Local citizens are 
allowed to vote for the peoples’ representatives who will then represent local 
interests at the People’s Congress at various levels. Rural workers are registered 
as rural residents. In the past, rural migrants without urban residency were not 
eligible to participate in any urban political activities. Nowadays, some local 
governments granted rural workers who have stayed in a city for more than 2 
years the right to vote. However, rural workers have a very high turnover rate. 
Their settlement is very much related to job availability. What is more, the jobs 
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they do, such as construction, require them to move from place to place as the 
employers undertake construction projects in different parts of the country. 
Therefore, the urban political system does not reflect the opinions of this large 
group of mobile population. 
 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES 
Rural labour can have three opportunities when they settle down in urban areas. 
First, if they have close relatives such as partners or children who are urban 
citizens, they can emigrate for family reunion. Second, they may come to urban 
areas to work. Third, they can go to universities and, upon graduation, if they 
can find jobs in urban areas, they may expect to have their rural residency 
change to urban residency. The first and third opportunities are only suitable for 
a small percentage of rural population. The absolute majority of rural labours 
come to the city to look for jobs. At the beginning, rural workers tended to take 
up jobs that urban residents were not interested in doing, such as work that 
demand heavy labour, in a dirty environment or in extreme conditions. Urban 
residents welcomed them.  
 
However, in recent years, the presence of rural workers in urban areas has 
pressed on the urban labour market. The feeling of pressure is particularly 
strong as urban unemployment becomes increasingly severe. Figure 5 is the 
officially published unemployment rate. It suggests that the rate of urban 
unemployment has increased constantly for over ten years. However, the 
official data on unemployment, including the people who are fired, have no 
renewed contract and suffer from work unit bankruptcy, only shows the tip of 
the iceberg. Several elements that contribute to urban unemployment are not 
included in official statistics. The most important element is the laid-off workers 
from state enterprises8 (see Figure 6A and 6B). Although laid off workers are 
not counted as unemployed, they have in practice lost their jobs and are looking 
for jobs in the labour market. If laid off workers are also included, the urban 
unemployment rate in China may be as high as 8-9% (Cai and Wang, 2003). 
What is more, many laid-off workers are now trained for re-employment. They 
are counted as employed. In the near future, there will be large numbers of 
                                                
8 
 Laid-off workers appeared in the late 1990s. It refers to the workers who have 
lost their jobs, but still keep close connections with the previous employers. 
They receive part (often 60% or more) of the basic salaries and receive social 
services such as re-employment training. The training programs last for three 
years. During the training period, laid-off workers do not register as 
“unemployed”. By the end of 2003, when laid off workers are integrated into 
the unemployment social security schemes, the former will not be counted 
separately from unemployed workers. 
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people completing the training programs and become job hunters. Secondly, the 
age ranges for the official statistics of unemployment are 16-50 for men and 16-
45 for women. The coverage is much younger than the actual retirement age. 
Thirdly, the people who are not registered with social security services are not 
counted as unemployed. Therefore, the actual situation of urban unemployment 
is more serious than what the official statistics suggest.  
 
Fast growing urban unemployment has two effects. First, to protect local 
interests, local governments try to discourage employment of people from other 
parts of the county (Cai, et al., 2001). Second, rural workers were blamed for 
job losses and caused increased resentment among urban citizens. 
 
Permission to work and financial losses 
To be able to work legally in urban areas, rural residents have to obtain a 
number of certificates before they can start working. Table 1 lists the 
regulations in Beijing and Shanghai, two of the largest cities in China that have 
attracted large number of outsiders.  
 
There are various charges when rural workers apply for the certificates. 
According to an investigation by Chen and Qiao (2002) at the end of October 
2001, a rural worker had to pay money for all services offered by the local 
authorities: the costs of producing the Certificate of Temporary Residency, 
Certificate of Employment, the costs of producing and administration and 
checking fee for the Certificate of Marriage and Child Birth, the costs of 
producing and check up fee for issuing Health Certificate, the costs of 
producing and administration charge for the Card for Registration of 
Employment Outside Local Areas, Administration Charge for People Coming to 
Stay in Beijing, charge for Training, Urban Life Garbage Processing Charge, 
City Population Expansion Fee, Labour Adjustment Fee, Obligatory Blood 
Donation Fee, etc. If rural workers need to live in private accommodation, they 
have to pay Contract Filing Fee for Renting Private Accommodation. If they go 
to a job centre, they need to pay a job introduction fee. If their children need to 
go to school, the parents have to pay Guest Studying Fee and School Sponsor 
Fee. They also need to pay Inspection and Guidance Fee for Non State 
Education, if the children go to a private school. If they need to book the tickets 
to go back to their hometown, they will have to pay ticket service charge. 
 
The costs of obtaining these certificates vary in different cities. In Beijing, the 
costs are around RMB500 yuan in total. In Shanghai, farmers need to pay 
RMB600 before they can start working. In Shenzhen, the costs are as high as 
RMB1000 yuan. None of the charges are one off charges. Many certificates are 
only effective for one year. Some even need to be renewed more frequently.  
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Local governments use these methods to control labour migration. In many 
cases, money is collected but there is no service. For example, when rural 
workers apply for Health Certificate in Beijing, they do not get any health check 
as suggested in local regulations (Chen and Qiao, 2002). The money charged for 
the certificates can be non-negligible revenue for the local government.  
 
Access to labour market 
Governments at various levels issue various policies to prevent rural labour 
from entering the local job market or limit the types of jobs that they can take 
(Cai, et al., 2001).  
 
In November 1994, the Ministry of Labour issued “The Temporary Regulation 
on the Administration of Cross-Provincial Employment of Rural Workers” 
(Nongcun Laodongli Kuasheng Liudong Jiuye Guanli Zanxing Guiding). The 
regulation later became a supplement to the Labour Law. Article 5 of the 
regulation sets strict limits for urban employers to hire workers from outside 
their own provinces. According to this regulation, an outside worker can only be 
recruited when no local people are qualified and the employer has to obtain 
approval from the local labour and employment agency. Guided by this 
regulation, local governments started to issue their own policies.  
 
On 13 February 1995, the Shanghai Bureau of Labour issued “The Regulation 
on Categorised Usage and Employment of Labour from Outside Shanghai by 
Local Employers” (Shanghaishi Danwi Shiyong he Pinyong Waidi Laodongli 
Fenlei Guanli Banfa). According to this regulation, jobs are divided into three 
categories: 
A.  outside labours allowed; 
B.  limited usage of outside labour; and,  
C.  outside labours forbidden.  
In 2001, Shanghai Bureau of Labour and Social Security issued a notice on 
recruiting outsiders. In the notice, five new types of jobs were closed to the 
outsiders. They were:  
1)  logistic workers; 
2)  cleaners, staff for horticulture maintenance, and safe guards in the 
public sector; 
3)  shop assistants; 
4)  housing estate maintenance staff; and  
5)  cleaners for public transportation. 
Employees from outside Shanghai who are already in these positions should be 
fired before the end of June 2001. The employers who failed to follow the rules 
would be charged with heavy fines. 
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Shanghai was considered by many other cities in the country as a “successful 
example”. In 1996, Beijing issued “The 1996 Lists of Jobs That Usage of 
People from Outside Beijing Is Allowed or Restricted” (1996 nian benshi yunxu 
he xianzhi shiyong waidi renyuan de hangye gongzhong fanwei) (Beijing 
Bureau of Labour, 1996b) and the “Notice of Beijing Bureau of Labour on 
Issues Related to Recruiting Workers from Outside Beijing” (Beijingshi 
Laodongju Guanyu Yongren Danwei Zhaoyong Waidi Wugong Renyuan 
Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi) (Beijing Bureau of Labour, 1996a). These two 
documents explicitly set the principal of “Urban First, Rural Second; Beijing 
First, Outside Second”. The occupations that are allowed to hire rural workers 
and outsiders are mainly heavy labour works that would not be taken up by 
local residents. In 1999, Beijing Bureau of Labour and Social Security (1999) 
“The 2000 Requirement for Hiring People from Outside Beijing: Industries, 
Occupations, Educational and Professional Qualifications” (2000 nian 
Beijingshi yunxu he shiyooong waidi laijing renyuan de hangye, zhiye ji 
wenhua chengdu, zhiye jishi nengli). 
 
In Qingdao, Shandong Province, regulations require that outsiders do not 
consist of more than 14 per cent of the total number of employees in local 
companies. To employ an outsider, an employer had to pay 50 yuan; but to 
employ a local people who had been unemployed for more than 6 months and 
older than a certain age (35 for women and 40 for men), an employer could get 
3000 yuan of subsidies from the government.  
 
In Wuhan, Hubei Province, the “Wuhan Labour Market Administration Rules” 
(Wuhanshi Laodongli Shichang Guanli Tiaoli) issued on 22 January 1999 
announced that employers who recruited local unemployed and laid-off workers 
would be eligible to benefits from the local government; but those who recruit 
outsiders should follow the instructions in the local guidelines for limited usage 
of outside labourers (Jiang, 2002). 
 
These regulations have effectively prevented rural labour to enter the urban 
labour market (He, 1998; Chen and Qiao, 2002). Even if rural workers succeed 
in settling down in urban areas, the job restrictions suggest that they are only 
allowed to do manual work. 
 
Unequal pay  
The salaries of rural workers are often below the local minimum wage or lower 
than the salaries of urban workers doing the same job. It is not uncommon that 
rural workers receive only half or even less than half of the salaries received by 
their urban peer workers (Dong and Bowles, 2002; Zhao, 1999; Chan, 1998). 
Rural workers usually receive their pay annually. Quite often, they have to cope 
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with serious delays in getting the pay for their work (Xu and Wang, 2003; Jin, 
2001).  
There are four occasions when wage payment is delayed. First, some 
enterprises, especially loss generating state enterprises, have difficulties paying 
their employees, including rural workers. Also some foreign enterprises facing 
financial difficulties cannot pay wages on time. In extreme cases, some 
employers run away without paying any salaries to the workers, so the latter’s 
whole year hard working is in vain. Secondly, some employers deliberately 
delay the payment to rural workers. It happens very often in restaurants, 
garment manufacturers and shoe makers. These employers use the unpaid 
money as working capital. Thirdly, some construction companies delay 
payment because of inefficient settlement practices in the whole bidding, 
undertaking and construction process. It is always rural workers who are the last 
ones to get paid. More than 50 per cent of the salaries in the construction 
industry are paid behind schedule. Fourthly, when disputes arise, some 
employers delay payment to keep their own interests in control (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2003a, 2003b). According to All China Federation of Trade Unions, by 
the end of 2003, employers owe up to RMB100 billion yuan salary to rural 
workers (US$12 billion).  
 
SOCIAL PROTECTION AND VULNERABILITY 
Despite of the efforts to remove the limits on labour mobility, some 
incompatible features of the old and new systems during transition have become 
great barriers to mobility. These barriers exist in the social welfare system under 
reform. Rural workers as well as other “outsiders” without urban residency are 
not eligible to social protections and services funded by local budgets.  
 
Poor housing conditions 
New comers have to find affordable accommodations. Usually, rural workers 
cannot afford to buy or rent houses in the private market. They have three ways 
to arrange accommodations and settle down. The choices of accommodation 
arrangement are dependent on the type of work they do (Lid, 2003). The first is 
to rent houses in informal settlement or farmers’ houses in suburbs or even in 
inner city areas. The most typical example is rural workers’ “villages”. The 
residents in these villages work for small private businesses. Sometimes they 
are self-employed. Sometimes they are jobless and live on casual incomes such 
as begging. Usually, the residents of one village come from the same province 
or hometown. The second is to live in the dormitories or temporary 
accommodations offered by employers. These dormitories are very close to 
work and rural workers do not have much contact with urban residents. Their 
employers are either construction companies or manufacturing enterprises (such 
as textile or garment, or shoe companies) or public sector institutions (such as 
universities, vocational schools). The third is to live with urban residents. They 
 25 
can either live in urban households as chore workers, or rent or buy houses 
directly. The new comers who can afford to buy houses can be self-employed or 
private business owners or white-collar workers.  
 
Long working hours and poor working conditions 
Rural workers are often forced to work long hours. According to a survey 
carried out in Guangdong, 80.5 per cent of the rural workers work for 11 to 14 
hours per day. 47.2 per cent of the workers do not rest during the weekend 
(China People’s Congress News, 06-09-2002). In many enterprises, employers 
only pay salaries at the end of each year. If they are not happy with their 
workers performance, they can reduce the salaries or even refuse to pay. Thus, 
rural workers have very little bargaining power over the working hours (Yin, 
2003; Chan, 1998). 
 
Many employers fail to observe the regulations on the standards of working 
conditions and do not take adequate precautions or follow the safety regulations. 
Workers either have to work in extreme conditions or with poisonous 
chemicals. Labour injuries happen from time to time (Chen and Chan, 1999).  
 
Local governments have no incentives to intervene with the exploitative actions 
of employers. Local governments are interested in attracting more investors. 
Local policy makers and policy implementers tend to act in favour of 
employers. Therefore, although there are regulations to protect the basic rights 
of workers, the regulations are loosely enforced (Yin, 2003; Zhou, 2002). 
 
No contract or unfair contracts 
Most rural workers do not sign contracts with their employers. Even those who 
have signed contracts do not have the power to negotiate the terms. 
Governments at various levels try hard to persuade rural workers to go to formal 
job agents and sign contracts before they start working. However, rural workers 
often neglect the warnings.  
 
Once rural workers come into town, they are eager to look for jobs and can’t 
wait to get interviewed by agents. They prefer to meet employers in person. If 
wages are acceptable, they are happy to start working straightaway. According 
to a survey by Li (2003) in 1995 in Shangdong Province, around 75 per cent of 
the interviewed rural workers found their first job through introduction of 
relatives or town fellows. Around 8.5 per cent found jobs through direct contact 
with the employers. And only less than 1 per cent found jobs through job 
centres or agents.  
 
In late 1990s, with more rural workers coming to urban areas, job centres began 
to play a more important role in matching the market demand and supply. 
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However, Job centres or local labour markets often charge fees for providing 
information to rural workers. The payment is not refundable even if the 
information does not help. Although some job centres do not charge for 
employment information, they charge under different names such as training 
fees and membership fees (Chen and Qiao, 2002). According to a court case 
reported by Nanfang Daily (2001) a job agent signed a collective contract with a 
state owned enterprise for introducing rural workers to the company. The job 
centre charged the employees they had introduced on a monthly basis. The fees 
were deducted directly from the salary of the rural workers. Every month, the 
job centre took away more than 700 yuan (more than 1/3 of the monthly salary) 
from each worker. The workers had not been informed of the charges until they 
found out by themselves and brought the job centre to court. According to the 
court file, in two years, the job centre earned more than 8 million yuan from 
working for this one company alone. 
 
All these factors support the development of informal job markets. New comers 
either trust their friends or relatives for employment information, or they go to 
the informal markets to meet the employers directly. Usually, there is no 
contract between the employers and the employees. The workers have no 
protection when disputes arise. 
 
No effective union protection 
Labour unions are established to protect the employees’ rights and prevent them 
from being exploited or maltreated by employers. According to the Labour 
Union Law, all employees should have the right to join trade unions.  
 
In practice, rural workers are not organised as urban workers are. First of all, 
very few of non-state owned factories have unions. Secondly, even in the 
factories that have set up unions, in most cases, unions have very little 
bargaining power with employers. They fail to voice workers’ need and cannot 
protect workers’ rights (Chan, 2000a, 2000b). According to a research based on 
a random survey in Shenzhen where rural workers are concentrated (Shenzhen 
News, 2003), among 203 interviewees, only 3.6 per cent had joined unions, and 
very few knew about the existence and functions of unions. The local 
government explained that there were no discriminatory policies against rural 
workers to join the unions. However, rural workers have never been officially 
categorised as proper urban employees and therefore, it is not uncommon that 
unions are reluctant to accept rural workers (Southern City Daily, 2003a). 
Thirdly, in another perspective, rural workers have little awareness of self-
protection and seldom seek union support actively. 
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Lack of social protection 
In the planned economy, social welfare was provided to urban residents either 
through work or through local governments. The basic welfare included 
healthcare, education for the children, pension and housing, subsidies for food 
and clothes, heating, and subsidies for transportation. These benefits were not 
available to rural residents. Since the economic reform, anyone living in the 
cities can buy food, clothes and various subsidised goods in the market. 
Although housing privatisation was a recent development, the emerging market 
for private rental and ownership made it possible for rural residents to arrange 
accommodation in urban and suburban areas. However, in the new system, 
some housing related benefits are only available to urban residents either via 
social insurance schemes or government subsidies, such as cheap rental housing 
or subsidised private ownership.  
 
In terms of social protection, urban residents nowadays are eligible for five 
types of social insurances: pension, unemployment, health, work injuries and 
maternity leave. According to the regulations, employers and employees should 
contribute jointly to a forced saving account (individual account). Rural workers 
are no exceptions. Nevertheless, the current methods of contribution working 
together with the prevailing labour market conditions make it almost impossible 
for rural workers to be covered properly. According to the regulation on 
individual account, a worker should pay 10 per cent of his/her salary to the 
individual account and his/her employer should pay 34 per cent of the salary 
once the worker has paid his/her share. However, in practice, employers are 
reluctant to contribute to social insurances for rural employees. Many urban 
employers find 34 per cent of the salaries for social insurance contributions an 
unbearable burden. Moreover, rural workers should be able to cash their social 
insurance contributions once they decide to move on. However, the regulation 
requires employers to apply for termination of social insurance account on 
behalf of the rural workers. But rural workers seldom stay at one job for a very 
long time. It means whoever leaves their job, the employers have to handle the 
application for withdrawal of social insurance contribution. Employers are 
reluctant to spend extra administrative costs dealing with leaving employees. As 
a result, it is very likely that the rural workers leave their job with nothing. This 
is certainly a disincentive for rural workers to make their contribution.  
 
What is more, many rural workers come to town each year. The job market is 
highly competitive. Many rural workers voluntarily give up the rights to social 
insurances. Employers would rather hire the “less troublesome”.  
 
Insufficient child education  
Some rural workers live in urban areas and often bring their families along. 
However, because their children do not have urban residency, they are not 
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eligible for compulsory education that is geographically bounded. Either their 
parents have to pay market fees or education sponsorship charges, which are 
unlikely to be affordable to the majority of rural workers, or have to send their 
children to informal schools. However, local authorities are interested in closing 
down informal schools because of the inferior standard. It is estimated that there 
are roughly 200,000 children of rural workers in each of Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. In some cities, such as Shanghai, the local government took actions 
to solve the problem. The teachers from informal schools receive training so 
that the teaching quality can be improved. Informal schools co-exist with formal 
schools. In Xiamen (Amoi) public schools are allowed to rent out classrooms to 
private school teachers so that they can teach the rural workers’ children. 
However, in Beijing, the government has tight control over schools. The 
education of children from outside the city has remained a serious problem (Fu 
and Li, 2003; Zhang, 2002). 
 
SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
In general, rural workers are discriminated against in urban areas. They work 
and live in the cities and are literally urban residents. However, they are 
excluded from many aspects of the political, economic and social life that are 
enjoyed by urban residents. They are the largest group of the underclass living 
in urban areas. Media attention and academic research have partially revealed 
the harsh conditions and unfair treatments that rural workers are suffering from. 
Although the publicity of some of the issues have led to responses in some local 
governments (such as the removal of the Hukou system in some cities in 
Zhengjiang and Jiangsu Provinces) and the Central Government (such as the 
removal of the policy on arresting and eviction of rural workers who do not 
carry IDs), so far the legal framework and institutions to protect rural workers 
from getting unequally treated are still very weak. 
 
Conclusion 
The profile of social exclusion in post reform China shows that the conflict 
between the co-existing old and new systems is intense. The picture is a very 
mixed one: absolute poverty has been reduced but income inequality has 
significantly increased. Some earlier sources of social exclusion disappeared, 
but a number of new issues start to affect the livelihood of different groups of 
people. The pro-growth strategy featuring low redistribution and less protection 
of labourers has pressed the people at the bottom even further down. An 
underclass that is largely neglected by the new rules has appeared.  
 
However, low income cannot fully represent the concept of social exclusion. In 
China, social exclusion does not only reflect the shortage of resources to 
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participate in the mainstream social life, but also the deprivation of 
opportunities or social rights. The existing rural-urban conflicts exemplify the 
latter form of social exclusion.  
The social exclusion discussed in this paper has several features: 
 
First, in a developing economy going through major economic transition, the 
frequency and number of rule changes have caused extra challenges to the 
understanding of social exclusion. Has the current social exclusion lasting 
effects? If the rules might be rewritten again, does it make sense to study the 
current socially excluded? The experiences in China offer a very good example 
of the different abilities of people from different backgrounds in influencing the 
process of policymaking or rule rewriting. Where a certain group of people does 
not have a voice in policy-making process and where they are not politically 
represented, they may be left out in the long run.  
 
Secondly, it emphasises the active role played by the other members of the 
society against the excluded. It reflects the willingness of the excluded to 
participate in the ordinary life, but facing low tolerance of some other members 
in the society. Such relations do not exist at the top of the society. Therefore, we 
cannot find a symmetric group at the top of the society, which is largely 
voluntarily excluded from the rest of the society, as discussed by Barry (2002). 
 
Thirdly, the socially excluded is a fairly large percentage of the population. 
However, in urban areas, the size of the excluded population is growing as more 
rural people move into towns. It reflects the inability of urban areas to cope with 
fast economic growth and the need for urbanisation. 
 
Finally, the socially excluded do not only suffer from poverty. Their problems 
are related to the problems embedded in various aspects of social policy. It is 
hard to deal with social exclusion only via one or two measures such as the 
stopping the practice of ID check or even removal of Hukou system.  
 
In general, urban social exclusion in China reflects a number of constraints in 
urban development during the economic reform. Apart from physical and 
financial barriers, such as the relatively smaller capacity of urban areas to 
provide jobs and earnings for the population, there are also constraints that are 
related to the weakness in the political, economic and social security systems 
under reform.  
 
The role of policy factors should not be underestimated. It does not only provide 
the basis for differential treatment to citizens from different backgrounds in 
terms of entitlement to job opportunities and social protection, but also 
encourages discrimination of some urban citizens against “the others”, such as 
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rural residents. This discrimination exists in the daily interaction between urban 
and rural residents, as well as the daily policy implementation by the 
government officials.  
 
To tackle the problems, it is almost impossible to avoid the political 
sensitiveness of these issues. Rather, there need be efforts to make 
comprehensive efforts, including reforming the political representation for the 
“underclass”, removing the barriers to employment, revising the entitlement 
structure to social protection. At the same time, the state might embark on 
campaigns to educate the policy implementers and the other urban citizens to 
treat all the citizens equally and humanely. Clearly, this should also be 
coordinated with the efforts to channel voices of the underclass through the 
political system. 
 
 31 
Figure 1: Social Classes and Social Stratifications after the Reform 
 
 
Sources: Lu (2002). 
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Figure 2: The Shifting Ground for the Poor 
 
Note:  
1. Enterprise employees who are covered by the newly established social welfare 
system. 
2. Enterprise employees who are included in the welfare system but cannot receive the 
welfare as promised. 
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Figure 3: Income per Capita 
 
Data Source: China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook, Related issues. 
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Figure 4: Economic Activities of Rural Labour 
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Note: Agriculture refers to rural residents who are engaged in agricultural activities. Non-
Agriculture refers to rural residents who do not participate in agricultural activities and work 
in other parts of the economy. 
Data Source: China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook, Related issues. 
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Table 1 
Places Regulations Documents 
Whole 
China 
Rules for Hukou Registration of 
the People’s Republic of China 
(zhonghua renmin gonghe guo 
Hukou dengji tiaoli) (Standing 
Committee of the People’s 
Congress, PRC, 1958) 
People leaving their places of permanent 
residency and about to live in another cities 
for more than three days should register for 
Temporary Residency 
Beijing “Administrative Regulations on 
Resident Registration for People 
Coming to Stay in Beijing” 
(Beijingshi Waidi Laijing 
Renyuan Huji Guanli 
Guiding)(Beijing Bureau of Public 
Security, 1995) 
Certificate for Temporary Residency 
 
  “Administrative Rules on 
Peopling Coming to Work and Do 
Business in Beijing” (Beijingshi 
Waidi Laijing wugong jingshang 
renyuan guanli tiaoli)(Standing 
Committee of the People’s 
Congress, Beijing, PRC, 1995b) 
Certificate for Temporary Residency 
Certificate for Marriage and Child Birth 
Certificate for Employment of Out Comers 
  “Administrative Regulations on 
Peopling Coming to Work in 
Beijing” (Beijingshi waidi laijing 
renyuan wugong guanli tiaoli) 
(Beijing Municipal Government, 
1995c) 
Certificate for Temporary Residency 
Certificate for Marriage and Child Birth 
Card of Registration for Working Outside 
the Local Area 
Certificate for Employment of Out Comers 
Other required documents 
 “Administrative Regulations on 
Peopling Coming to Do Business 
in Beijing” (Beijingshi waidi 
laijing renyuan wugong guanli 
tiaoli)(Beijing Municipal 
Government, 1995a) 
To start private business 
ID and Certificate for Temporary Residency 
Business Licence or Certificate of Doing 
Business in Beijing by the Business 
Administration Authorities of the Place of 
Origin 
Proof for legal usage of business site 
Certificate for Marriage and Child Birth 
Certificate of professional qualification if 
provide professional services 
Other required documents 
To apply for business licence 
Minimum requirement for educational level: 
secondary school (if doing businesses 
encouraged by the local government, can be 
less strict); Age limit: 16 years or older; 
Healthy 
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To do business within the encouraged or 
allowed industry, scope of business and way 
of doing business. 
All the other required documents 
  “Administrative Regulations on 
Renting Houses by People 
Coming to Stay in Beijing” 
(Beijingshi waidi laijing renyuan 
zulin fangwu guanli guiding) 
(Beijing Municipal Government, 
1995) 
Certificate of Temporary Residency, 
Certificate of Marriage and Child Birth 
Health Certificate (after the tenant arrives in 
Beijing for 1 month) 
Lease 
  “Administrative Regulations on 
Family Planning for People 
Coming to Stay in Beijing” 
(Beijingshi waidi laijing renyuan 
jihua shengyu guanli 
guiding)(Beijing Municipal 
Government, 1991)  
Certificate of Marriage and Child Birth 
Beijing Temporary Resident Family 
Planning Certificate 
  “Administrative Regulations on 
Hygiene and Illness Prevention for 
People Coming to Stay in Beijing” 
(Beijingshi waidi laijing renyuan 
weisheng fangyi guanli 
guiding)(Beijing Municipal 
Government, 1999) 
Certificate for Temporary Residency 
Health Certificate 
  “Administrative Regulations on 
People Coming to Beijing to 
Provide as Housework Services 
(Revised)” (Beijingshi waidi 
laijing renyuan congshi jiating 
fuwu gongzuo guanli huiding 
(xiuzheng)(Beijing Municipal 
Government, 1997) 
ID and Certificate for Temporary Residency 
Health Certificate 
Card of Registration for Employment 
Outside Local Areas issued by the 
Administrative departments above county 
level at the place of origin 
Certificate of Marriage and Child Birth 
Other required certificates 
The job centre can issue  
Certificate for Employment of Out Comers 
(Family service) to the applicant if the 
applicant is:  
Older than 16 years; 
Healthy; 
Graduated from secondary school or having 
higher education; 
Trained by professional agencies; and, 
Able to present all the required documents. 
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Shanghai Shanghai Administrative Rules for 
People Flowing in from Outside 
(Shanghaishi wailai liudong 
renyuan guanli tiaoli) (Shanghai 
Municipal Government, 1996) 
Certificate of Temporary Residency 
(effective for 2 years): ID, Proof of address 
and proof of business or employment 
Health Certificate: Stamp on Certificate of 
Temporary Residency 
Housing lease: ID, Health Certificate 
 
  
 
 “Shanghai Administrative 
Measures for Family Planning for 
People Flowing from Outside” 
(Shanghaishi wailai liudong 
renyuan jihua shengyu guanli 
banfa) (Shanghai Municipal 
Government, 1998) 
 
ID and Certificate for Temporary Resident 
Certificate for Floating Population Family 
Planning issued by local authorities at place 
of origin 
Stamped once every year 
 
 
 
 “Temporary Regulations on 
Introducing Talents through 
‘Shanghai Certificate of 
Resident’” (Yinjin rencai shixing 
‘Shanghaishi juzhu zheng’zhidu 
zanxing guiding”(Shanghai 
Municipal Government, 2002) 
 
 
Proof of Education (university level| or 
above) or proof of special talent 
(Professional certificate or proof of 
performance) 
ID 
Proof of address 
Health certificate issued by sound hospitals 
in Shanghai 
Employment or labour contract 
Business proof 
Foreigners applying from Shanghai should 
provide proof of entrance  
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Figure 5: Registered Urban Unemployment 
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Data Source: China Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook, Related Issues. 
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Figure 6A                                     Figure 6B 
 
 
Note: The numbers of laid off workers drop significantly in the 2001 and 2002. It is because 
of the partial integration of laid off worker system and the unemployment social security 
scheme.  
Data Source: China Labour Statistics Yearbook, Related Issues. 
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